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1. Introduction
This paper was originally written as part of an economicsstudy commissioned by the Chief Directorate: Marineand Coastal Management (MCM) of the South AfricanDepartment of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
(DEAT).
Since the 1994 negotiated revolution, South Africas fishing
industry has been under pressure to become transformed, just
like most other industries and administrative institutions. The
broad goals of the new dispensation were gradually spelt out,
starting with an initiative in late 1994 which led to the
establishment of the Fisheries Policy Development Committee
(FPDC), via a White Paper on fisheries policy in 1997, and finally
on to the passing of new legislation at the end of 1998  the
Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA). Although the Act is clearly
a compromise between the existing industry owners and the
political representatives of previously disadvantaged groups, it
nevertheless opened a considerable action space by insisting
on the need to restructure the fishing industry to address
historical imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches
of the fishing industry (MLRA section 2(j)).
And reform was urgently needed. Just like the rest of South
African society, the fishing industry was extremely racially
skewed in terms of ownership of existing vessels and factories,
as well as the allocation of quotas and fishing rights (Hersoug
1998; Hersoug & Holm 2000). The same pattern applied to
industry leadership and fisheries administration  it was
predominantly white. However, after years of discussions and
planning, the high hopes pinned on implementing the proposed
reforms have not borne fruit. More than two years after having
passed the new MLRA, there is a high level of confusion about
what is expected of the established industry and what is
possible (in terms of redistributing quotas and fishing rights) for
the new prospective entrants. In spite of having produced the
long-awaited new framework for fisheries, production is falling,
distribution conflicts seem to be endemic, litigation is becoming
more common and huge human as well as economic resources
are being expended on all kinds of rent-seeking behaviour.
What went wrong and why?
The following is an account of the transformation process so
far (May 2001), based on information from central as well as
local sources. Basically, we are interested in showing how the
results of the transformation process have deviated from the
ideals of the MLRA, and explain why this happened in spite of
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goodwill and political backing from the government. In this
paper we focus on three groups of actors: established owners
and operators, successful new entrants and the large group of
unsuccessful applicants, many of whom happen to be
subsistence fishers. How have these groups manoeuvred to
reach their goals and to what extent have they succeeded? An
earlier analysis identifies the outcome as being the result of
implementation problems (Hersoug 2000). This time the
ambition is more to cover the internal dynamic, the dialectical
process in which political decisions constitute the starting point
of social processes, where different actors try to utilise the
action space created, by mobilising support for their own cause,
with a result that is very different from the one envisaged by the
politicians when they enacted the MLRA.
Political and economic transformation is seldom easy, and
South Africa is no exception, in spite of the numerous claims of
a miracle transformation. What is special about the fishing
industry is that the present transformation takes place largely
as a zero-sum game, where what is given to new entrants has to
be taken away from existing operators. Furthermore, the South
African process is special in that there are no models or
blueprints for how to turn a fully developed, capitalised and
largely monopolised industry into a more diversified structure,
containing a large number of entrants hardly familiar with
running business entities in the first place. As we are going to
show, there are definite limits to redistribution, and the bottom
line is that there is no way that all previously disadvantaged
fishers could possibly receive a fishing right or quota.
Nevertheless, our argument here is that the meagre results of
the redistribution exercise so far is more due to imprecise ideas
about what transformation is meant to achieve, lack of
understanding of what is necessary to level the playing field,
and finally the problem of anchoring the reform in an enabling
structure. This is due to basic flaws in the governments general
economic strategy, based on economic growth through private
entrepreneurs, which is expected to result in employment and
income for the poor masses through the trickle-down effect. So
far, very little has trickled down in the fisheries industry, and
this paper tries to explain why.
The first section describes the new fisheries policy from its
inception in 1994 to the present day. The second deals with the
aggregated results in terms of quota redistributed in each of the
major fisheries. The third deals specifically with the strategies of
the new entrants, illustrated by case stories from four selected
fishing communities. The fourth explains the strategies of the
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established owners and demonstrates how, through joint
ventures, they have tried to incorporate new entrants to the
industry. The fifth section deals with the unsuccessful
applicants and in particular with the fate of the subsistence
fishers. In Section 6 we discuss the disputed concepts of
transformation, empowerment, previously disadvantaged
groups and individuals (PDIs) and the idea of fishing
communities. Without a more precise idea of what the concepts
mean, it is difficult to measure the impact of the new policy.
Section 7 discusses new initiatives as they were early in 2001,
asking whether it is possible to see the contours of an entirely
different allocation process. The eighth and last section reviews
the process so far, explaining the three lost years, the meagre
results and the unexpected outcomes of the process, all adding
up to a more dynamic understanding of policy implementation.
This section also sums up the policy lessons so far and indicates
some ideas for the future, taking for granted that a more just
distribution is still on the agenda.
As with earlier works, we have relied on a large number of
informants; centrally in Marine and Coastal Management, and
locally within the fishing communities of Elands Bay, Hout Bay,
Mossel Bay and Jeffreys Bay. In addition we have had access to
a large number of official documents, grey departmental drafts
as well as official statistics. Last but not least, one of the authors
has spent considerable time in each of the four communities
doing the actual fieldwork. Visiting each community many times
has given her the advantage of not only following the dynamic
process over time, but also of cross-checking disputed
information. And, as usual, nothing comes for free. The
fieldworker has on many occasions provided information to
applicants, arranged workshops and assisted as far as possible,
without compromising the actual research.
Writing from the storms eye is a risky undertaking, as
configurations change rapidly and last years successful players
are not necessarily as successful this year. In addition, new
policy initiatives come up all the time, reflecting that the new
regime is anything but stable. By the time this paper is
published, some of the more detailed information may already
be outdated. However, we strongly believe that the basic
inherent problems do not change as fast, and that the issues we
raise remain critical in trying to improve delivery on the ground.
Many of our informants claim that the new fisheries policy is all
about money. Our contention is that much more is at stake.
Without a reasonably successful redistribution of rights and
resources and a meaningful transformation, South Africa will
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never succeed in obtaining a sustainable resource management
regime in biological, economic or social terms. In the end it is a
question of legitimacy, that is, to what extent the new policy is
accepted, not only by the active fishers, but also by the large
number of have-nots.
2. The process leading up to the new MLRA
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourisminitiated the process of drafting a new fisheries policy inOctober 1994. The immediate background was unrestamong fishers and fish workers over the dispensation of
the time, which they claimed was corrupt and insensitive to the
very difficult situation of most coastal communities. By that time
some African National Congress (ANC)-aligned groups in the
fishing industry had already worked out a preliminary
programme as part of the organisations election manifesto. In
December 1994, a meeting was held in Cape Town to discuss
how a new fisheries policy could be developed. It was agreed
that a Fisheries Policy Development Committee would be
established with a mandate to produce a Green Paper on the
fisheries policy. The committee consisted of five representatives
from each of the 13 different sectors of the fishing industry. In
addition, one representative was appointed by each of the
maritime provinces. Including a representative from the
Ministry, the committee totalled 70 members.
The first meeting of the Plenary Committee agreed that a
working committee had to be chosen to carry out the task. This
Working Committee consisted originally of 18 members, drawn
from all the participating groups in the plenary committee.
Later, the Working Committee was enlarged with more members
from organised labour, which claimed it was under-represented,
and the plenary group was increased to 150 members. The
FPDC requested all stakeholders to submit their ideas for a first
integrated document, and these ideas were discussed at
subsequent meetings in order to identify areas of agreement.
On issues where the FPDC was not able to find a common
solution, technical teams were set up to provide possible
solutions. Six technical task teams were appointed, of which the
Technical Team on Access Rights played the most prominent
role. In most of these teams scientists played lead roles.
By May 1996 the Working Committee of the FPDC had
finalised a draft, which was endorsed in principle by the Plenary
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Committee during a two-day meeting in Cape Town, although
with strong reservations from some sectors. By 4 June the final
document (FPDC 1996) was handed over to the Minister. In the
meantime the transitional Government of National Unity ended
and the ANC took over government . After some hesitation, the
process of drafting a White Paper started, with a Norwegian
consultant hired as an unbiased expert, working in co-
operation with some of the leading scientists from Sea Fisheries.
The issues of access rights and transferability continued to be
contentious. The FPDC had proposed transferable rights,
granted in perpetuity, but without being very specific about
their nature or how the system was supposed to bring
redistribution in favour of previously disadvantaged groups. In
order to move the process forward, the Minister nominated a
panel of specialists to review the access rights options. After four
months and extensive consultation, the Access Rights Panel
delivered its report to Cabinet, with clear recommendations as to
the nature of the access rights. They were to be real, long-term,
rights, transferable and inheritable.
With slight editing, the recommendations of the Access Rights
Panel were written into the White Paper, which was presented to
Parliament in May 1997 (DEAT 1997). The White Paper was
distributed widely so as to contribute further to the policy
debate over the proposed changes. Contrary to the normal
procedure, however, the writing of a Bill on the new fisheries
policy was not held over until responses to the White Paper had
been received. Because of the pressure to produce speedy
results, the Marine Living Resources Bill (RSA 1997) was
prepared in a parallel process with the White Paper. As part of
its internal deliberations, DEAT had appointed a legal task
team, consisting of local and foreign experts, to review the Sea
Fisheries Act of 1988. The team soon discovered that it would be
impossible to implement the proposed policy through the
existing law and advised the drafting of a new Bill to be started
immediately.
By the end of September 1997 the Bill had been introduced,
adhering strictly to most of the major recommendations in the
White Paper. Then a new political process was started by
Parliaments Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs and
Tourism. The committee was not happy with some of the
recommendations of the White Paper and the content of the Bill,
in particular with the idea of real, long-term and transferable
property rights. After a lengthy process of hearings, the portfolio
committee was able to reach a compromise on all contentious
issues, including access rights (RSA 1998). After this truly
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remarkable compromise, the National Assembly passed the Bill
in May 1998. The Bill was passed by the National Council of
Provinces with a few technical amendments and the Act was
gazetted in September 1998. In principle the 1998/99
allocations could then be implemented according to the new
Marine Living Resources Act. Due to legal technicalities, several
of the old right-holders were able to successfully resist the first
round of redistribution (1998/99), but for the 1999/2000
season the MLRA was the basis for the new policy.
3. Reallocation in numbers  the provisional results1
We have on earlier occasions been somewhatpessimistic about the prospects for success of a full-scale reallocation process (Hersoug & Holm 1999).The existing industry refused to make any
concessions during the FPDC process, and the process of
gearing up the administration to do the actual work took a long
time. In view of the figures presented below, we were clearly too
pessimistic, although it is highly unlikely that the results
obtained in 2000 will survive the more stringent process of
allocating long-term rights which is due to start in 2001/02. In
order to review the whole reallocation process, we have started
in 1992, thus including the reallocation which took place
through the old Quota Board which was operative from 1991 to
1998.
Starting with one of the most disputed resources, abalone,
the picture is fairly clear. The number of rights holders have
increased from five in 1992 to 47 in 2000 and the rights are now
shared among five established companies and 47 new entrants.
In terms of tonnage, the established companies now control
45%, the new entrants have been allocated 47%, and 8% has
been set aside for subsistence fishers.2
If we also take the shareholder transformation of the
established companies into consideration, the previously
disadvantaged are allocated 77% of the total allowable catch
(TAC). As can be seen in Table 1, the old Quota Board made a
rather modest effort in terms of restructuring this sector,
increasing the allocation to new entrants from 2% to 9% of TAC.3
The dramatic restructuring took place in 1999, being followed
up in 2000 with specific allocation also made for the subsistence
fishers.
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Table 1: The allocation of abalone quotas 19922000 (kg)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Established 605 000 100 605 000 98 482 194 91 280 000 56 243 680 45
industry
New 0 0 10 000 2 47 806 9 223 000 44 256 320 47
entrants
Subsistence 45 000 8
Total TAC 605 000 100 615 000 100 530 000 100 503 000 100 545 000 100
Source: Stuttaford (19922000)
Table 2 gives the comparable figures for West Coast rock
lobster, which is also among the most disputed species, being
easily accessible to small-scale fishers. In this sector a
considerable reallocation had already taken place before 1994.
From 1992 to 2000 the number of rights holders has increased
from 40 to 229. Here the new quota holders (including the
subsistence fishers) control 44%, while the established
companies have 43% of the total commercial quota and the
recreational fishers what remains. In 2000 the increase (from
40% to 44%) is mainly due to a special allocation to subsistence
fishers. If restructuring of the established companies is taken
into consideration, the previously disadvantaged have now been
allocated approximately 70% of the total quota, or a little less
than in the abalone sector.
Table 2: The allocation of West Coast rock lobster quotas 19922000 (kg)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %*
Established 2 322 280 97 1 623 352 74 1 189 194 62 1 008 604 60 911 552 42
industry
New entrants 576 648 26 724 721 38 686 396 40 953 448 44
& subsistence
Total 2 322 280 97 2 200 000 100 1 913 915 100 1 695 000 100 1 865 000 87
commercial
Total TAC 2 400 000 100 2 200 000 100 1 920 000 100 1 700 000 100 2 156 000 100
Source: Stuttaford (1992-2000) * Does not add up due to rounding
In South Coast rock lobster the established sector succeeded
in keeping the structure nearly intact up to 1998, with only a
minor allocation for new entrants. The three years which
followed saw a major reallocation, with new entrants now
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controlling 38%, or 62% if the restructuring of established
companies is taken into consideration.
Table 3: The allocation for South Coast rock lobster quotas 19922000 (kg)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Established 450 000 100 405 000 90 359 470 89 279 072 69 233 215 62
industry
New 45 000 10 42 530 11 122 928 31 143 785 38
entrants
Total TAC 450 000 100 450 000 100 402 000 100 402 000 100 377 000 100
Source: Stuttaford (19922000)
In the allocation of pilchard, the old Quota Board was also
active, but the major drive towards restructuring the pelagic
sector started with the 1998 allocation, to be followed up and
reinforced in 1999. New entrants now control 48% and, if the
restructuring of established companies is also considered, the
share increases to 72%. In anchovy, where TACs are also highly
variable, the profile is quite different, with a major reallocation
carried out through the Quota Board in 1994. Nevertheless, the
end result is quite similar to the pilchard allocation, with new
entrants now controlling 45%, or 71% if restructuring of the
established companies is factored in.
Table 4: The allocation of pilchard quotas 19922000 (tonnes)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Established 25 121 93 21 313 92 61 911 65 62 161 52 57 441 52
industry
New 1 879 7 1 787 8 33 418 35 56 539 48 53 065 48
entrants
Total TAC 27 000 100 23 100 100 95 329 100 118 700 100 110 506 100
Source: Stuttaford (19922000)
Table 5: The allocation of anchovy quotas 19922000 (tonnes)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Established 327 875 94 135 478 53 59 758 61 125 720 54 159 647 55
industry
New 20 125 6 122 522 47 38 245 39 105 380 46 131 353 45
entrants
Total TAC 348 000 100 258 000 100 98 003 100 231 100 100 291 000 100
Source: Stuttaford (19922000)
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In the most valuable hake sector, there has also been a
sizeable reallocation of quotas, although the magnitude is
considerably less than in the above-mentioned sectors. At
present 28% of the total quota is allocated to new entrants (55
in the actual trawl fishery + 195 long-lining and 300 hand-
lining). The established companies still control 72%, a figure
that is reduced to 54% if the transformation of the established
companies is taken into consideration. Unlike the two previous
sectors, hardly any transformation took place before 1994, but a
big boost came from 1998 onwards. The increase in 2000 is
largely due to special allocations for long-lining and hand-
lining, mainly going to new entrants.
Table 6: The allocation of hake quotas 19922000 (tonnes)
1992 % 1994 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Established 130 053 100 130 263 97 123 333.3 82 110 920.7 78 110 200 72
industry




Total TAC 130 053 100 134 424 100 151 000.2 100 143 100 100 154 000 100
Source: Stuttaford (19922000)
From the information in Tables 16, it seems that a major
shift has taken place in terms of quota allocations, with the
notable exception of hake trawling (deep-sea). But, contrary to
popular perceptions, a considerable part of this transformation
actually happened before 1998 as a result of the rather
haphazard policies of the Quota Board. Since then further
progress has been made in 1998 and 1999, to the extent that
the pelagic industry now claims that the process should be
declared complete because the industry more accurately reflects
the general racial demographic structure of South Africa.4 There
are two problems with this interpretation. First, that we have not
examined the extent to which the new entrants function only as
front companies for the old established ones. With considerable
experience from the apartheid era in setting up front
companies, daughter companies and holding companies,
Manning (2000) has shown, in the case of Namibia, that it is
very difficult to really ascertain who owns or controls what.
Secondly, we have not looked into how the new entrants
operate, that is, to what extent they lease their quotas forward
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to others without any substantial investment in labour or
money. Although it is impossible to trace more than 800 new
entrants (companies, co-operatives, close corporations, and
individuals), a brief examination of some of the new entrants
from various fishing communities along the coast can give an
impression of how the new entrants really operate. In this case
the main question is to what extent reallocation has implied a
real transformation of the industry? To what extent is
transformation more than just a quota allocation numbers
game?
4. The new entrants  needy or just greedy?
Since 1994 when the Quota Board started its gradual and very limited transformation process, most actors in the South African fishing industry have been interested in the new entrants. With the open application process
initiated through the MLRA in 1998, the interest grew to an
obsession  everybody wanted to be a new entrant. In order to
succeed in their applications, they created many co-operatives,
close corporations (CCs), private companies and holding
companies. Unfortunately only a fraction succeeded (less than
10%), resulting in recriminations, lack of faith in the
transformation process and numerous anecdotes describing the
lucky ones, most often characterised as paper quota owners or
worse. But who are they and what have they achieved so far?
Below we take a snapshot of five new entrants to illustrate the
variety of persons and companies which have entered the
industry over the last few years. We do not claim they are
representative of all new entrants (of which there have been
more than 1 000 since 1994), but they are all important players
in their local communities and their fate can be used to
illustrate the possibilities as well as limitations of the present
policy of selecting a fraction of the needy and turning them into
entrepreneurs.
4.1 Organising the needy: South African Commercial Fishermen Co-
operatives (SACFC)
SACFC was registered in 1997 after a massive campaign to
organise the 3 000 informal fishers in co-operatives in the
various fishing communities in South Africa. The organisational
work had been going on for several years with a large media
campaign, extensive lobbying and mediating with MCM, the
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Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Parliaments
Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs, arguing in favour
of more equitable access rights for bona fide poor fishers.
Hence, after a successful campaign during 199899, SACFC
became the largest new entrant in the South African fishing
industry. SACFC consists of 25 co-operatives with 2 935
informal fishers from Doring Bay on the West Coast to Jeffreys
Bay on the East Coast. Based on the company structure and the
number of members, SACFC was allocated the largest quota ever
given to a new entrant in the West Coast rock lobster  59 tons,
in addition to 20 tons of abalone, 300 tons of long-line hake and
40 squid permits.
The philosophy of SACFC at the time was its one man, one
job policy. The mission of the company is to serve and promote
the interest of all its members by running a professional fishing
company and using the profits it generates to invest in various
types of community programmes and expand opportunities
through economic empowerment schemes. The vision of South
African Commercial Fishermens Holdings (SACFH) stands on
two pillars: one commercial and one social, each supporting the
other. Profit is seen as essential to the survival of the group in
order to improve the quality of life of all its members, their
families and the communities in which they reside. Hence the
company is striving to strike a balance between socially useful
activities and financial rewards. Thus far, the company has
invested R2.5-million in a joint venture agreement with the
established fishing company Oceana called Ikamva Lethu (our
future), R1-million in a hake processing plant in Mossel Bay,
R1.4-million in boats, R800 000 in vehicles, fishing equipment
and office equipment. It now has assets worth R3-million.
Coupled with these achievements comes the very challenging
task of managing the expectations of its impatient members. As
a matter of policy, it was decided to reinvest all profits generated
by the quota allocations in the company for at least the first
three years. This message made the top structure of the
company very unpopular and more than 300 fishermen have left
the organisation. Since 1997 the management view has changed
somewhat towards a more profit-oriented style, finding that the
promises of jobs and income were difficult to fulfil in the short
term. This has in turn led to more dissatisfied members and to
occasional violence among various factions. Many fishermen now
feel that this co-operative set-up was yet another system that
only benefited the top structure of the SACFC, not the ordinary
fishers as was promised. The shift in strategic policy led to the
formation of two different blocs. Led by former leader Andy
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Johnston, a group of dissidents left the organisation after
dramatic clashes and intimidation of the remaining leadership,
many of whom resigned fearing for their lives. According to a
former Chief Executive Officer, Z Moolla:
Only 500 of the 2700 members have been employed by the
co-operatives during the first two years of operation and the
one man one job philosophy is difficult to implement. The
company has to deal with the economic growth on the on
hand and alleviate poverty on the other hand, which at
times are an impossible task to do. Furthermore we do not
have any support from MCM or NGOs to assist in the training
and empowerment of our members that need the most basic
literacy and numeracy training, driving licences, basic
communication via telephone and fax, decision-making
skills, operations of a meeting, basic bookkeeping and
entrepreneurial skills. These are the kind of problems that
the established companies do not have to deal with in that
they employed qualified people to run their operation. In
retrospect, for this company to start big was a big mistake.
However, we would not have been allocated our existing
quotas based on a small, local company.
Others are less pessimistic, hoping the company will ride out
the storm and gradually acquire more quotas and hence be able
to employ more people and pay dividends to all owners.
Whatever the future, the story of the co-operative illustrates
vividly how difficult it is to organise informal fishers from widely
disparate fishing communities and keep them in an
organisation which has to start from rock bottom. Getting the
rights and quotas is only the first step, processing and selling
with a profit is the next, while keeping a large organisation
intact is an ongoing task.
4.2 Going the private route: Kouga Fishing (Pty) Ltd
Kouga Fishing (Pty) Ltd. was established in 2000 as an umbrella
company to represent successful new entrants in the Kouga
area of Oyster Bay, St. Francis Bay, Humansdorp and Jeffreys
Bay. The company represents five new entrant entities with 36
members, three directors, two managers, and a company
secretary. The species allocation include 540 tons of hake
(trawled), 100 tons of hake (long-line), 3 tons of abalone, 7 squid
permits, 3 800 tons of anchovy, 500 tons of pilchards, and 11
tons of South Coast rock lobster. Kouga Fishing has invested in
a number of joint venture arrangements, covering vessels as well
as processing factories.5
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Securing long-term fishing rights and more viable quotas for
its five entities drives the mission of the company. Kouga
Fishing is one of the few success stories in the Eastern Cape
fishing industry. Its working recipe seems to be having both a
lawyer and a politician in the leadership. The lawyers
responsibility is to oversee all the technicalities involved in the
quota applications and the joint venture agreements between
various companies. The politicians responsibility is to use his
political network to secure better quota allocation and long-term
rights. He has been instrumental in forming the Kouga Fishing
enterprise and represents the companys interest in the various
stakeholder and association meetings. The networking involves
interaction with ANC government officials and lobbying with
MCM and the established industries. The duo believe in a
shotgun approach by applying for all quota species available on
behalf of the often-neglected Eastern Cape fishing communities.
Although it has been successful in its quota applications,
there are good reasons to ask how the company empowers its
new members. According to the lawyer, it is necessary to teach
the members boardroom manners. While this may be urgent
and necessary, far more basic training is needed to enable the
new black entrants to really participate in the running of the
joint ventures. At present, most of the new entrants are silent as
they receive a handsome profit for just leasing their respective
quota allocations to the joint ventures. They are therefore
characterised as typical cardboard or paper quota holders.
4.3 Pooling the resources: Blue Horizon Holdings
Because the quota allocation for West Coast rock lobster (WCRL)
to new entrants is limited to only 25 tons per entrant, quota
holders must pool their allocations in order to break out of
being paper quota holders. Blue Horizon Holdings in Hout Bay
was established by a female entrepreneur and her politically
connected husband, both of whom also act as consultants to
assist close corporations in Hout Bay with quota applications.
They initiated the idea of a group of new entrants pooling their
allocations. Daddys Money CC, Du Preez Fishing CC, Bluefin
CC, Louwenians CC and Olympia CC pooled their WCRL
allocations to add up to a viable total of 21 tons. The group
registered under a new name  Conquistador Holdings 
believing that this co-operation would give them a better chance
of setting up joint ventures with the established industry.
Conquistador Holdings consists of 50 members from the Hout
Bay fishing community, ten of whom are women. According to
Ms S Meter, managing director of the new holding company, the
established actors have a certain moral obligation:
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Established companies with infrastructure must realise that
they need to facilitate investment opportunities and cushion
those investments for new entrants rather than using the
opportunity to exploit new entrants. Viable proposals of
investment will benefit the entire industry.
As new entrants, Conquistador Holdings lacked start-up capital,
infrastructure and business skills. Its members decided after
approaching many established companies that the Saldanha
Group provided the best possible agreement at the time in
terms of processing and marketing their quota. Saldanha Group
and Conquistador Holdings formed another company called
Blue Horizon Holdings with a total WCRL quota of 41 tons. Blue
Horizon Holdings then entered a joint venture agreement with
an established processing and marketing concern called Greys
Marine. Furthermore, Blue Horizon Holdings have 50% shares
in the Saldanha Group, and 50% shares in a pilchard vessel.
This joint venture agreement is generally seen as an example
of successful black emerging entrepreneurs and the actors
themselves believed that networking with key political figures,
applying pressure on MCM officials to allocate access rights to
women, and marketing their company via the media
(newspapers, radio and television) added to the success of this
initiative. However, in practice these joint venture agreements
are more complicated. According to Mr Adams of Olympians
Fishing CC:
The joint venture agreements with the established white
companies is ripping us [new entrants] off by not
transforming the industry or their companies. They are not
concerned with real transformation, that is why they form
new companies with new entrants with new names and do
not want us. We are not involved in the running and
operations of our own company that we formed with them.
The industry wants to reap the profits on both sides but
when the new company fails they do not have to take
responsibility. We as new entrants want real transformation,
not these window dressing joint ventures that we find
ourselves in. We have no support from credit institutions and
when we approach the banks they want us to use our
homes as collateral and we refuse to do that and question
why they do not give us the same treatment as the whites.
Still up to today whites benefits more from the credit
institutions.6
The story of Bluefin Holdings and Conquistador seems to
underline the important distinction between being a successful
quota applicant and being able to use such a quota to succeed
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in business as well. While leadership, entrepreneurial skills and
good political contacts may have been instrumental in getting
the quotas in the first place (Isaacs & Hersoug 2000), other
(business) qualifications are needed to run the companies,
unless the entrants are absentee shareholders or sleeping
partners.
4.4 Active owners: the BMC close corporation
BMC, a Mossel Bay-based enterprise better known as Brown
the skipper, Meyer the engineer and Christy the administrator,
formed a close corporation with seven fishermen. The three
leaders are the majority shareholders whilst seven others have
equal shares and fish on the boat. The corporation has been an
unsuccessful quota applicant for five years and only received its
first quota in 1999 with 175 tons of hake inshore trawl, 10 tons
sole and eight squid permits. BMC CC has formed a joint
venture to process and market its quota allocation with the local
established fishing company Irvin & Johnson (I&J). The skipper
Brown was an employer of this company. As a result of the lack
of co-operation in the Mossel Bay community amongst quota
holders, BMC decided to form a joint venture with I&J on the
grounds of better the devil you know than the devil you dont
know. Furthermore, the skipper states that:
I know how to catch the fish and be a skipper but I do not
know anything on how to process, market or manage the
quota. I am learning every day and I do get the assistance
from the company, they show me how to do my budget but I
do not trust them with everything, thus I make use of my
lawyer and accountant if the company needs to make a
decision.
However, the quota allocation is not economically viable in that
it only provides work for four months of the year. According to
BMC, the business has monthly meetings with all the
shareholders to explain the new developments in the industry,
investments, the current budget and agreements it has entered
into. The close corporation has just invested R100 000 in an
inshore trawl vessel that cost R600 000. Members plan to pay off
boat in the next three years and hope that government will
double their quota allocation. They leased a boat from I&J to
catch their current allocation. Judging from the costs which
were incurred, profits have been meagre in the first year. It may
suit established companies very well to sell older boats to new
entrants because in doing so they shed the risk of having to do
frequent repairs to old vessels. BMC has bought a 14% share in
Mossel Bay Fishing Pty. Ltd, a new black economic
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empowerment privately-owned company. According to the
skipper, the new entrants in the fishing industry experience a
lack of support from government institutions, credit institutions
and local industries  we do not have the business skills and
collateral to compete with the existing industries. As a result,
new entrants have no alternative but to co-operate with one
another from a weak position:
We know that we cannot compete with the local industry if
we are alone. Furthermore, what is expected of us (new
entrants) in one year the industry had 50 years to establish
with the active support of the government. The government
states that we should invest in fishing enterprises, but we
are left on our own with no support and we feel that if we
do not make investments we risk losing our quota.
Whether co-operative, corporate company, holding company or
close corporation, the new entrants, although lucky to have
received quotas, have only cleared the first hurdle. The next is to
compete successfully with the established companies from the
very first day, not having any business training or any forms of
secure credit. Some, as shown above, are able to pull themselves
up by their bootstraps, but the majority end up as passive
owners, receiving payments on their quota holdings which are
nowhere near their real value, unable to influence the
important decisions regarding investments and strategies. To
what extent this passive ownership will qualify for the next
round of more permanent quota allocations remains to be seen.
What should be abundantly clear is that reallocation is only one
step in the process of transformation, and that it is in fact
possible to have a massive reallocation of rights and quotas
without much transformation in terms of empowering new
entrants to be active participants in the industry.
5. Window dressing or real transformation?
Strategies of the established companies
To what extent have the established companies beentransformed? Before the MLRA was passed, most of theestablished companies had seen the writing on the wall:You either have to dye or to die! said the head of one
prominent fishing company. The new government had clearly
indicated that transformation of the existing industry was a sine
qua non  a non-negotiable  but transformation to what? On
that point the FPDC, the White Paper and the MLRA were not
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clear  the interpretation of the transformation word was left up
to the companies themselves. Some of the larger fishing
companies, owned by even larger holding companies, made an
early move by being part of some of the first black empowerment
schemes. They calculated that a larger degree of black
ownership would strengthen their claims for new and existing
quotas.
Oceana was one of the early movers to lead the
transformation in the industry, selling half of its equity to a
black economic empowerment consortium comprising various
black business entrepreneurs, together with savings funds from
churches and labour union pension funds.7 Premier Pty. Ltd. is
now owned by the empowerment group Sekunjalo, which
calculated that a larger degree of black ownership would
strengthen its claims for quotas, both existing and new.
Other large companies, like Sea Harvest and Irvin & Johnson
started on a more modest scale, offering limited shareholding
ownership for employees at favourable prices. Although
employee shareholding never constituted more than a small
percentage of the total stock, the symbolic effect was considered
important. Blacks, even workers, were made shareholders and
received annual dividends.8 A third strategy was to bring in new
black leaders in an attempt to transform the leadership
structure. The labour unions viewed this with considerable
suspicion as part of a window dressing exercise in which a few
prominent blacks were given the privileges of power but no right
to make decisions. However, some of the fishing companies
succeeded in attracting former prominent leaders from the
struggle against apartheid and well conversant with the
problems in the fishing industry. These include Chris Nissen,
former head of Economic Affairs in the Western Cape and
prominent ANC leader, now chairman of Sea Harvest; Johnny
Issel, previous ANC Western Cape activist and politician, now
director of transformation in Premier Fishing; Tokyo Sexwale,
former Gauteng Premier, on the board of Sekunjalo Holdings;
and Adelaide Tambo, who brings strong links to the ANC
Womens League to the Irvin & Johnson consortium. In this way
the companies obtained better representivity in their leadership
structures, and acquired valuable political contacts to the ruling
ANC, securing channels of communication both to and from
government.
The fourth strategy, much demanded by the unions, was to
improve labour conditions (salaries, fringe benefits, pension
schemes, training and skills upgrading schemes) is much
harder to assess. Most companies claim that such improvements
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have been implemented to some extent, while unions are
sceptical. Both sides claim that the present situation is largely
to blame for the lack of substantial results, as annual quota
allocations give little security and thereby few incentives for
long-term investment in human as well as physical capital.
Several of the large fishing companies are represented in the
four communities researched by the authors. To some extent
they have all transformed in terms of ownership, leadership or
working conditions, although to a variable degree. Less
impressive is the transformation among the small and medium-
sized established companies. Their strategies have mainly been
limited to various forms of joint ventures, often selling off old
vessels as part of joint venture arrangements. The strategies are
invariably the same  let the new quota owners obtain shares in
vessels or minority shares in processing companies in return for
delivering catches to the established company.
Joint venture (JV) arrangements no doubt fulfil the need of
the new quota owners to obtain some type of equity within short
time  to escape being accused of being a paper quota owner.
Whether these arrangements can be seen as a form of real
transformation is open to debate. According to some industry
analysts, the whole JV industry is a convenient way of shedding
risks, selling old boats, while keeping the more profitable
processing and marketing operations for themselves. When new
JV partners are allowed into the processing companies, they are
most commonly only minority shareholders with little influence
on strategic decisions. However, there are some rare examples of
real skills transfer and training in which the new owners have
been actively involved from the very first day.
6. Fishing  social policy or commercial
micro-enterprise?
During the FPDC process there was constant talk of subsistence fishers, but then in the context of fishing for immediate consumption in certain areascharacterised by extreme poverty. In spite of rather
different notions of who could qualify as subsistence fisher, the
concept survived the whole policy making process and ended up
as one of the defined categories of fishers in the MLRA:
Subsistence fisher means a natural person who regularly
catches fish for personal consumption or for the consumption
of his or her dependants, including one who engages from
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time to time in the local sale or barter of excess catch, but
does not include a person who engages on a substantial
scale in the sale of fish on a commercial basis.
However, due to other more pressing issues, not much
happened the first year. In 1999 it was time to revisit the issue,
especially in light of the high number of unsuccessful
applicants for ordinary quotas, approximately 10 000 of them.
The number of affected parties is much higher since many
applications are made by groups of people. A special
Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) was formed in
December 1998, consisting of two groups  the core group
consisting of 17 members with divergent areas of expertise, and
the consultative group comprising 20 members to provide
information and support to the core group. The SFTG succeeded
in surveying the entire coast within a short time to compile a list
of 143 fishing communities in which approximately 30 000
fishers were identified as subsistence fishers (SFTG 2000). Based
on this report, a pilot programme started in various fishing
communities on the West Coast, targeting West Coast rock
lobster for the last part of the 1999/2000 fishing season.
The possibilities and limitations of the approach are
illustrated by the experience of a group in Elands Bay,
identified as an impoverished community by the Subsistence
Fishing Task Group (SFTG 2000). The group allocated 147
permits for the last two weeks of the 1999/2000 fishing after a
quick screening process. Before the permits were allocated to
the subsistence fishers, the local ANC branch together with an
MCM official took the initiative to reach an agreement with
Oceana Fishing Company to process and market the catches of
these fishers.9 Most of these fishers were not actively involved in
the actual fishing of the lobster, being happy that they would
get a salary at the end of the week for doing absolutely nothing.
In the meantime, pressure was put on MCM to increase the
size of the scheme. It was then decided to extend the rights of
the experimental group for the next season (2000/2001),
awaiting the implementation of a new, more permanent system.
When MCMs newly created special unit started its information
campaign in September 2000, the road show visited 49 fishing
communities along the West Coast and South Coast. The
meetings were open to all members of the community and all
stakeholders in the fishing industry. The aim of the meetings
was to provide a solution to all unsuccessful applicants, giving
them a minimum catch per day. But the scheme was not for
charity alone. MCM saw the possibility of trading access with
better compliance, asking each of the participating communities
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to nominate a committee containing at least three experienced
fishers, to liase with MCM. One of the main goals of this
committee is to get their things in order, that is to clean up
local corruption, illegal catching and selling. Another task is to
collect a copy of the identity documents of persons in the
community who qualify according to the criteria set up by MCM.
It is considered important that the process should be open and
transparent and that the fisher forum should be legitimate. The
criteria for qualifying as a subsistence fisher are extensive and
detailed:
· Fishers must collect/fish personally, although immediate
family members registered under their permit/licence may
collect on their behalf (but not on the same day). Fishers
must not employ staff to undertake the harvesting,
processing or sale.
· All resources must be categorised in terms of their
suitability for use by subsistence.
· Only low-technology gear that is not capital-intensive may
be used for the capture and processing of subsistence
resources. Specifically excluded would be motorised boats,
electronic equipment, hookah and scuba gear.
· Subsistence fishers must live in close proximity to the
resource (that is, no more than 20km).
· In allocating rights, preference should be given to those
whose practice of fishing has a long-standing cultural or
traditional role (transmitted through at least three
generations or 50 years).
· To qualify for consideration, fishers should be poor and have
not other employment that yields sufficient income for the
resource to no longer be necessary to meet their basic food
requirements.
· Fishers must conform to the sustainable levels of harvest,
which will need to be set for each resource and in each
locality.
· Subsistence fishers may barter or sell excess catches
beyond consumption needs (within legal catch limits),
provided the sale is by the fishers personally, and the
resource is used for consumption within their local area
(that is, within 20km of the point of harvest).
· Any sale should be local (within 20km of the point of
capture), and the resource should be used for consumption
within that local area.
As could be expected, this new opportunity was also seized by
new as well as established industry. New entrants with boats
offered to catch and pay the rights holders for just leasing their
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rights offering R500 a week for doing absolutely nothing while
established companies offered processing and marketing in an
orderly fashion in return for the right of being the sole buyer. In
the end the established industry offered the best prospects.
According to one of the leading spokespersons for the
subsistence fishers in Elands Bay:
We are sick of being used by our own people and the empty
promises of the ANC. We do not trust them, they only see to
themselves and their friends. The ANC just want us to vote
for them in the local elections and then we do we do not see
them again in the community. The [established] industry has
provided us with jobs and we are guaranteed of an income.
We do not trust these new quota holders.
Needless to say, the new system also opens for creative ways of
circumventing the strict rules. The rates per kg of rock lobster in
the fishing communities are R80R115 and, taking fuel costs
into account, the permit holder can earn up to R500 per week.
Many of them are not actively involved in fishing activities, as
agreements are made with the skippers to just pick them up
and take them for a ride to show the fisheries inspector that
they are catching lobster while most of the fishing has been
done already. The lobster is then sold to one of the specifically
designated companies which takes care of the further
processing and marketing, at a handsome profit.
When MCM opened for general application for the 2000/2001
fishing season, 3 431 persons representing 49 communities
along the West Coast and South Coast applied for permits. And
as usual, the sheer paper work involved totally outstripped
MCMs capacity for handling the applications within a relatively
short time. This meant no allocations had yet been made by the
time the fishing season started and the fishers had to threaten
civil disobedience to get the fishery started through an official
exemption, awaiting the formalisation of the permit system. (The
list of approximately 1 700 subsistence permits was finally
released on 2 March 2001).
After only one ordinary season it is certainly to early to draw
any firm conclusions concerning the success of this new
category which is distinct from ordinary commercial fishers as
well as recreational fishers. Four rock lobster a day is certainly
better than nothing, considering the desperate poverty in many
of these coastal communities. Over time, it is also likely that the
scheme will be extended to cover other inshore species, with
abalone being next in line. At that point, subsistence fishing
could yield a marginal living. Organising the subsistence fishers
could in the next instance serve as a stepping stone for entering
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the ordinary commercial circuit, which is the preferred option
for most of these fishers. According to MCMs strategy, this
scheme could also serve to reduce illegal fishing and illegal
selling, provided that the fishers involved see the logic of
keeping catches within sustainable limits.
However, there are plenty of problems involved, not least
connected to the open access nature of the system, that is, the
category is potentially open for any needy person living in a
coastal community to qualify. In addition, there is an increasing
control problem, following each new category introduced into
the fishery. Not only do the authorities have to check that daily
bag-limits are being kept and catches not sold outside the
defined processors, but each fisher will also have to be checked
every year to see whether his or her credentials are still valid.
Given that MCM ran out of administrative and control capacity a
long time ago, the new scheme is an added responsibility. The
burden of proof is on MCM to show that the actual benefits are
larger than the costs. At present, the scheme is double edged: it
represents a significant (although limited) step towards using
marine resources to alleviate poverty, while at the same time
creating new cleavages and a substantial control problem.
Whether local co-operation in sustainable management can be
bought through this scheme remains to be seen.
7. Transformation?
The need for transformation has been stressed in all keydocuments since 1994, but what this means has neverelaborated. As explained above, transformation of theestablished companies has most often been interpreted
to mean a change in ownership and leadership in order better
to reflect the general composition of the South African
population, while for organised labour transformation has also
included improving labour practices, training and
empowerment. Because the term has never been precisely
defined, the companies being left to define their own
transformation goals, so the extent of transformation in the
industry varies widely. While transformation of the ownership
and control of existing companies has been a key issue for the
insiders, most coastal dwellers have been more concerned with
the aspect of transformation that has to do with redefining
access to marine resources. In the period 199498 this was
interpreted by the Quota Board as meaning occasionally
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admitting blacks to the industry, most often from the coloured
community. However, with the advent of the MLRA in 1998, the
issue of redistribution and a fair and equitable access was firmly
put on the agenda.10 At present there is still no binding
schedule, although by mid-2001 work had been initiated to
develop a proposal in this regard.
For many participants, including MCM, the measure of
transformation has been centred on numbers  the percentage
of TAC to be allocated to the previously disadvantaged. The
actual reallocation process has also, so far, been concentrating
on seemingly neutral numbers, ranking all applicants on the
same composite scale of factors. But transformation is more
than a number. Transformation could be seen as having at least
three different dimensions economic, social and political. The
economic dimension should be fairly evident in the South
African setting  the proceeds need to be distributed more
widely than the limited number of companies still dominating
the bulk of the industry. Getting more small and medium sized
companies involved is clearly a goal, but precisely how many is
difficult to assess on a scientific basis. Certain fishing operations
seem to require economies of scale and nobody (not even the
new entrants) would be served by a multitude of small
companies all competing with each other in the same narrow
markets.
Similar problems arise when assessing the social
transformation needed. More people should get a slice of the
pie, and within a number of companies, new as well as old, a
good argument can be made for a more equal distribution,
giving fishers and workers more and owners less. But also this
type of redistribution has limits, regarding what is viable in
terms of size and what can be distributed versus reinvested. In
certain fisheries it is also worth considering what will give the
largest employment (and hence the widest distribution of
benefits). A ton of hake can, for example, be used for a freezer
trawler, processing at sea, a wet-fish trawler delivering for
onshore processing, a long-liner or a hand-liner delivering for
the fresh fish markets, yielding very different results in terms of
employment and value added, all other conditions being equal.11
Whatever dimensions or indicators are used, there remains an
element of political discretion in such a transformation process.
The alternative would be lottery or auction with allocation to the
highest bidder  mechanisms that have been resisted so far for
political reasons.
Political transformation can be seen at two levels. Firstly,
resource management is now performed by a democratically-
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elected government with a professional bureaucratic
administration. However, the quality and representivity of the
administration is more doubtful, although some progress has
been made in transforming the service. Political transformation
is also used to describe a transformation of management at local
level, ritualistically referred to as co-management, without
much thought as to what should be administrated co-operatively
and through which structures. In the four communities we have
researched, there is not much interest in co-management 
most people here say that co-management without some type of
ownership is a rather far-fetched idea, their primary interest is
obtaining quotas. In certain communities in KwaZulu-Natal, co-
management structures have already been tested out with
promising results. It is obvious that all coastal dwellers cannot
be owners of commercial quotas, not even through community
quotas. They may nevertheless have an interest in management
of the fishing resources, as recreational or subsistence fishers.
Others may have an interest in marine resources for their
amenity value, that is, as a resource for recreational or
educational purposes. Hence, the challenge is to find structures
at local level that reflect not only the interests of the quota
owners, but also the interests of the larger community of user
groups. There is definitely a long way to go before this is
achieved, and South Africa needs to define who should be
qualified as potential recipients of the more permanent quotas.
Equally difficult has been the all-embracing concept of
previously disadvantaged individuals (and groups) or PDIs in
the South African fisheries parlance. In general political terms,
it is fairly evident what is meant by this phrase, namely blacks,
coloureds and Indians who under the previous dispensation
were barred from participating in the fishing industry, that is,
from fishing or from owning assets in the fishing industry.
However, as soon as we start operationalising the concept in the
practical setting of the South African fishing industry, it
becomes clear that there are different interpretations,
depending on whom you are talking to.
Black empowerment companies located far from the coast (for
example, in Gauteng) hold the broadest concept of preferential
access to PDIs. They claim that all previously disadvantaged
groups and individuals should be able to buy into the fishing
industry and receive quotas, regardless of where they live and
whether they have been previously involved with fishing or not.
By contrast, representatives of most coastal towns and
settlements claim that although marine resources are national
property, they rightly belong to coastal communities which
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traditionally used these resources. In other words, for access to
marine resources, PDIs should have some kind of connection to
coastal communities. Millions of PDIs live in coastal cities like
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth or Durban, although few of them will
have a historical connection to the utilisation of marine
resources.
Coastal communities want to restrict the group of PDIs who
qualify for redistribution of rights and quotas to those having
worked the sea, that is fishers and processing workers who have
participated in the industry for a considerable period of time. An
even narrower conception of PDIs within the established
industry says that quotas and rights should only be allocated
those PDIs who have made a clear investment in the industry,
that is, who have acquired equity in the form of shares in boats
or processing plants. This qualification has its roots in trying to
separate the true participants from paper-quota operators, that
is, the ones who just sell, hire or lease out their quotas.
Depending on how PDIs are defined, the process and its
results will be quite different. So far there has been a tendency
to use the widest definition of the concept, resulting in a
situation in which some quota holders are people who have no
previous connection to the fishing industry, while the majority
of fishers and processing workers have none. Are marine
resources primarily national property, to be used for the
creation of the largest possible economic surplus (resource fees
+ employment + export revenues) or do they in some way
belong the coastal communities as a general means of income,
more in line with a welfare payment? These positions are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. They can be seen as two
extremes on a continuum, with numerous positions in
between.12 In present day fisheries policy debate, the positions
can be illustrated by two recent developments (see the next
section). The idea of auctioning off part of the quotas is clearly
inspired by the goal of maximising the revenue from the sector,
while the allocation of so-called subsistence quotas is more in
line with relief assistance, giving some minimal quotas to fishers
who were not successful in the ordinary allocation process.
We are not arguing that one position is necessarily more
correct than the other, only that hard decisions have to be
made. There may be very different outcomes, depending on how
the resources are perceived and how PDIs are defined. This is
even more so since transformation (or lack thereof) is measured
by a number, for example by share of company turnover ending
up with PDIs (as has been suggested in a draft for the new
allocation process). While the concepts of transformation and
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PDIs have been instrumental in securing support from a very
diversified political community in the drafting of new fisheries
legislation, the same broad concepts are now increasingly seen
as counterproductive when it comes to implementation. Without
a more precise definition, MCM and the Ministry become open
to all sorts of litigation, especially from participants who are
denied access or those whose access is reduced. A more precise
definition is therefore a necessity to escape allegations of too
much administrative discretion, or in more plain language,
corruption.
The third and last crucial concept in the redistribution
process is fishing community. A more precise definition is
necessary, as more and more politicians and administrators use
this term to designate potential quota recipients and prospective
managers of local fisheries. In our opinion, most officials
misread the context. There is no question that South Africa has
a number of settlements along the coast which are dependent
on harvesting marine resources, either for sale or for direct
human consumption. That does not mean that these
settlements are able to operate as communities, with some
common interests managed through democratic or
representative organs. As shown, for example, in the case of
Elands Bay (see Isaacs & Hersoug 2000), the settlement is
clearly segregated along racial lines, where individuals and
groups operate completely independently of each other. This is
also representative of a number of other coastal settlements.
Due to forced removals and unregulated influx from the former
homelands as well as from neighbouring countries (Angola,
Namibia, Mozambique) few settlements possess the qualities we
normally associate with fishing communities. Handing over
quotas and rights to coastal communities is therefore
problematic. This was tried in 199394 as part of a policy of
social relief, an experiment that backfired dramatically as most
community trusts came up in serious problems, causing more
distress than ever.
The same problem exists today. Without proper organisational
structures, sound financial management, elected leaders and
policy transparency, there are few reasons for allocating rights
and quotas to communities, and even less reason to believe
that they can play a meaningful role in resource management.
Is it possible that the new forums which have been created to
assist in the allocation of subsistence quotas can serve as some
type of community organisation in the future? So far it seems
like lack of transparency on behalf of the self-appointed leaders
regarding the distribution of economic benefits is a major
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impediment. In any case, it seems like a solid organisational
drive is necessary before most coastal settlements can operate
as representative communities.13
8. Towards a new regime
By mid-2000 MCM admitted that the allocation processwas in deep trouble again. According to a documentreleased by the new Allocation Unit:
In the historic absence of a defined fishing rights allocation
procedure, the department has been unable to call upon any
dedicated capacity to manage the allocation process, and
this lack of capacity has meant that the department has
become so immersed in the mechanics of fishing rights
allocation that the development of an effective allocation
policy and plan has been severely compromised. This has
lead to a virtually permanent state of crisis management
with regard to rights allocation and a lack of proper
planning.
(DEAT 2000:8).
Hence, the work for a new paradigm started mid-2000 as a crisis
measure, headed by a professional trouble-shooter from the
Ministry of Finance. His mission was to get the allocation
process in order by mid-2001, in time for the allocation of long-
term rights. At the time of writing, the new regime is a proposal,
not yet steered through the political mill, that is Parliament, the
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the Cabinet.
However, indications are that the new system is likely to have
the full support of the present Minister and the Cabinet.
What is new in the proposed setup? First of all, the queue will
be dramatically reduced from 12 000 applicants in 1999/2000
by imposing a considerable application fee (graduated according
to size of quota), thereby discouraging less serious applicants. In
addition, applicants will have to submit proof that their tax
affairs are in order.
Secondly, the applicants who make it through the first
screening will have to conform to certain criteria, possibly more
detailed and technical than the present ones. Thirdly, quotas
will be assessed according to what is considered viable within
the different sub-sectors, as per the results of a recently
commissioned MCM economic study. Fourthly, within all sub-
sectors the industry will be divided according to size: large,
medium, small, micro, artisanal and subsistence. The number of
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viable entities within each stratum will be determined partly by
economic considerations, partly by political ones which envisage
a desired structure within each stratum, and eligible applicants
will be allocated a certain part of the quota. The remaining part
could be up for tender. Finally, transformation is seen as a 35
year process, and quotas will be issued accordingly. Thereafter,
long-term rights (up to 15 years) will be issued for the second
phase. The phasing-in of new entrants is planned through
annual attrition. If, for example, it is decided that a sub-sector
should be restructured so that 25% should be allocated to new
entrants, a percentage will revert back to the state every year so
that quota can be set aside for accommodating new entrants.
Alternatively, the transformation will take place through a once-
off process, with no adjustment until the next round of
allocations. It is envisaged that the transformation of existing
companies should take place using incentives rather than
punishment. Transformation should follow the bucks! is the
new slogan and the incentives will be arranged so that
companies which can prove they are successfully transforming
themselves will be offered the possibility of acquiring more
quotas, either by sale or by tender (DEAT 2001).
9. Implementing policy or learning from
experience?
We have earlier pointed to the fact that implementingthe new MLRA should be conceived more as apolitical experiment than the straightforwardimplementation of a prescribed policy (Hersoug
2000). There were no models nor blueprints available for how an
established fishing industry, dominated by vertically-integrated
companies, could be restructured to accommodate a new set of
participants who are largely unfamiliar with the actual running
of fishing as a business operation. The action space created by
the new Act was (and is) considerable. How new and old
operators would respond was not clear at the time the MLRA
was passed, with unexpected results.
Early in 2001 it was probably fair to say that the dynamics
created by the new MLRA totally outstripped the capacity of the
existing administration, thus creating a situation of great
uncertainty. While the original fishing industry was a limited
brotherhood in which most participants knew each other
personally and where positions were fixed according to size and
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tradition, the new Act opened a frenzied application race
involving more than 12 000 applicants in 1999/2000. Given that
fewer than 1 000 quotas were awarded, the vast majority of
applicants were disappointed. They questioned the legitimacy of
the whole process and, in particular, the legitimacy of MCM.
In spite of this, there is little doubt that a number of
previously disadvantaged individuals and groups have succeeded
in obtaining quotas (both before and after 1998) and that their
participation has already changed the face of the South African
fishing industry. Nevertheless, the bulk of the industry is still
controlled by white owners and operations established long
before 1994. This continued dominance in spite of clear
obligations to widespread reform is due to many factors. The
most important is probably the character of the 1994 political
transformation as a negotiated revolution, in which existing
owners and administrators received strong guarantees against
any sudden removal of property or employment. Once new
black empowerment groups had acquired certain key fishing
companies, prominent black voices also started to argue against
any major restructuring in terms of reallocating quotas. This
should also be seen in conjunction with the pressure already
exerted by the most important trade unions presented in the
fishing industry, lobbying in favour of protecting the jobs of
their members who are mainly employed in the established
companies. A final constraint is the governments clear need to
generate export income by whatever means. Large-scale
redistribution will not be allowed to interfere with the
generation of foreign exchange earnings. In other words, there
were serious limits to transformation from the outset, although
these were never made explicit.
A second set of factors influencing the outcome of the
transformation process was the strategies employed by existing
companies. While the MLRA opened a considerable action space
for new entrants, at the same time it created room for the
established companies to manoeuvre. They had the processing
facilities, the market contacts, the credit facilities and
established networks with fishing officials which they used to
their advantage. For processors with ample processing capacity,
the challenge was to acquire as much raw material as possible
through, for example, binding new quota holders to deliver their
catch to a particular factory. For ship owners and operators with
available catch capacity, the challenge was to increase the quota
available to them. As discussed above, a wide variety of
arrangements were made, ranging from formal joint ventures to
short-term informal deals. Lawyers and accountants served as
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consultants, often at exorbitant prices. In practice these
arrangements were only limited by fantasy, as no working
control unit was checking the modus operandi of the new
companies.
This brings us to the third set of factors: the lack of
administrative capacity to handle such a complicated process. It
was clear from the very start that the governments management
institution was not in any shape to handle such a complicated
undertaking, in legal, technical or political terms. MCM had no
clear political direction as to who should receive the new quotas,
or what the restructuring of the existing industry should
precisely entail. Consequently, MCM became increasingly
bogged down in the allocation process, to the extent that most of
its other important management tasks were neglected. Once
MCM finally admitted the state of affairs, it changed course,
challenging the industry players to make inputs which it could
use to create rule books for the industry. Although it is much
too early to assess the outcome of this new approach, the basic
elements seem to meet the shortcomings of the previous regime.
The focus on clear criteria, increasing capacity (outsourcing
certain elements of the handling of applications) and
establishment of a verification unit may improve the functioning
of the reallocation process.
In our terminology this is a second-order institutional
problem  sorting out the practicalities after the basic principles
of the system have been fixed. But in the new setting there are
also attempts to redefine the basic ground-rules  a first-order
institutional design problem. The proposed ordering of
applicants in size categories according to what is considered to
be a viable allocation, bidding for quotas, and making extra
quota available for the most successful transformers, are all
elements that may change the institutional setup, although the
MLRA allows for this. Generally, all attempts to make the
reallocation process a transparent one should be welcomed, as
long as it is clearly acknowledged that most of the difficult
choices are political. Although a thorough economic study may
reveal some basic understanding of profit levels and optimal size
within the various sub-sectors, political discretion still plays a
major role. Which sectors should primarily be earmarked for
transition (reallocation of quotas), how should they be
constructed in terms of size, how many new entrants should be
allowed within each sub-sector and, not least, what should they
have to pay in order to receive their quotas?
The question of payment is crucial to the legitimacy of the
new setup, but unfortunately this is the issue which has
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received the least attention. MCM seems to prefer a mix of
resource rental and cost recovery. These factors play a role for
very different reasons and have very different political
implications. Cost recovery provides for commercial operators to
pay for the authorities to administer their activities, as is done
in New Zealand and Australia. Resource rental is compensation
to society for giving the select few the privilege of continuing to
utilise a national resource, thereby acknowledging that the
resources were acquired without compensation in the first place.
Mixing the two without a clear argument (as in the Canadian
case) may be detrimental to both cost recovery and public
compensation.
So far, seen from the perspective of the established fishers
and the coastal communities, the result of the redistribution
process has been rather disappointing. The thrust of our
argument has been that the reallocation process has not worked
as anticipated due to lack of knowledge of how coastal
communities are structured and how they function in terms of
leadership and entrepreneurship. This is not an accidental
outcome, but the results of a general national policy which
promotes entrepreneurs in the hope that the poorest will
benefit through the trickle-down effect. As we have shown
previously (Hersoug 2000; Isaacs & Mohammed 2000; Isaacs &
Hersoug 2000) the entrepreneurs do not necessarily come from
the fishing industry or from coastal communities. In many
cases, entrepreneurs involvement with fishers has been to use
them for legitimacy in their business ventures without giving
the fishers much in return, being motivated primarily by self-
interest. The lack of control presented the opportunity to rip
people off, to the extent that many of the established fishers feel
worse off today than they did under apartheid. Although there
are also true community entrepreneurs, these are few and far
between. This is not always the result of greed  in many cases,
communities are so fractured along ethnic lines or badly
organised that they are not able to work well together for
mutual benefit.
This brings us to the last and most crucial part of the
implementation policy, namely the false notion that all
previously disadvantaged people should be able to start
competing without any additional input from government. For
the previously disadvantaged to stand any chance of challenging
the existing industry, the government would have to provide
capacity building and training, access to soft credit to help fund
new business ventures, and organisation, to bring people
together in functioning structures.
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The proposed reorganisation of the industry could help to
reverse the trend set by the three lost years of transformation
in the fishing industry. However, in the South African case, we
are also facing a real dilemma: a market-oriented fisheries
management system based on individual transferable quotas
cannot possibly be politically controlled to ensure that
redistribution targets are achieved. One way of organising the
fisheries sector would be to consider three sub-sectors:
· A fully commercial sub-sector, in which quotas are traded
and companies reorganised according to business
requirements, relatively isolated from direct political
influence, as long as they operate within the accepted
parameters of fisheries regulations and pay required fees
and rentals.
· A transitional sub-sector, mainly for new entrants who have
recently received a quota in which there are limitations on
transferring quotas (to avoid selling off quotas as soon as
they have been allocated).
· A subsistence fisheries sector, more correctly artisanal, as
most subsistence fishers on the West Coast and South Coast
would definitely be small-scale commercial operators. These
would be guided by non-transferable quotas, which have to
be caught personally. If this scheme is extended to comprise
more species and a larger geographic area, this could serve
as a security net for the poor, although on a very modest
scale.
Whether communities should receive quotas, as has been
proposed several times, would have to be decided at a much
later stage, after the organisational structures have been put in
place, their capacity assessed, and their responsibilities with
regard to handling money and redistribute fairly the proceeds of
common activities have been formalised. The forums developed
in connection with the subsistence fisheries in West Coast rock
lobster and abalone could be the frontrunners of such an
organisational structure. However, at this point there are few
signs that fisheries management can be handed over to either
localised or functional user-groups. Both types of structures are
weakly organised and do not have the capacity to handle more
complicated management issues. However, this should not be
read as an argument against starting the process now.
The first lesson from this exercise is that redistribution is a
process that needs organisational structures to secure the
political gains achieved in the first round. In the absence of
such structures, the reform effort fell apart, being captured by
other interests, not necessarily the most needy, but definitely
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among the more greedy. The second lesson is that whatever
regime is set up, the act of redistribution is clearly a political
one that can only to a limited degree be made technical. This is
not to say that criteria should not be made clear and processes
transparent, it only serves to underline that the actual process
of allocating public resources is a political act necessarily
involving an element of political discretion.14
The third lesson is even more important, regarding the
possibility of combining a market approach with a detailed
prescription of the distributional results. With a market-oriented
industry, based on transferable quotas, there can hardly be
strong political guidance as to the ideal structure or the
optimal structure. Operating (transitionally) with three
different regimes could be one way out of the dilemma but, in
the longer run, South Africa will have to make the hard choices:
Given a limited resource, not all previously disadvantaged can
get a direct slice of the pie. Benefits will have to be produced
through employment, dividends on ownership and a resource
rental, levied on behalf of the greater South African public (in
addition to the value of recreational fishing and the amenity
value of a unique marine environment). Maybe South Africa, like
Namibia, should start considering whether the income from the
resource rental could be as important as the redistribution of
ownership.
In any case, South Africa will have to sort out the direction of
the reallocation process. While it should be accepted that not all
applicants could receive a quota, there is still room for choice.
The choice is not, as often presented between treating the
fisheries as an industry or a charity. Most of the previously
disadvantaged living in the coastal communities are not asking
for charity, but for meaningful participation and support
structures to compete in the commercial sector. Even with a
limited share set aside for reallocation (now approximately 25%
of the TAC), it is a question of political choice. So far it has been
run much like a beauty contest, with a number of the more
greedy gaining access through being able to hire expensive
consultants to formulate fancy plans and projections. While not
discounting the need for entrepreneurs on all levels, we believe
more could be done to involve previously disadvantaged groups
and individuals. Measures should include development-oriented
support structures in training, empowerment, credit and other
matters that focus on managing quotas, processing and the
marketing of quotas. Hence, it is a question of more than just
redistributing money in terms of assisting the performance of
PDI fishers through training, empowerment and credit. In any
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case, a large number of people (even in the coastal communities)
will still not receive a quota. If a solution for these groups cannot
be found in the fishing sector, other alternatives must be
examined, for instance diversification into other sectors. Getting
people employed in other sectors (including aquaculture) will
help to take off some pressure on the fishing resources. That, in
the end, is also a question of money. Part of this development
work could be paid through a decent resource rental, in terms of
which private operators pay for the exclusive use of a public
resource.
Endnotes
1. Before examining the provisional results, it is important to
note that South African authorities decided to make only
short-term allocations in the first round, waiting for more
permanent guidelines. Quotas were therefore allocated for
only one year at a time (although allocations made in 1999
were extended for a second year in 2000).
2. One of the reasons for this dramatic shift is that the abalone
divers were previously not rights holders, unlike the
processing companies. Now the divers control the largest
quota (87.3 tons) through the Overberg Commercial Abalone
Divers Association.
3. As indicated earlier, most of the original reallocation in 1998
was reversed, after the established companies had taken the
Minister to court and won the case, based on a legal
technicality.
4. Interview with Themba Vundla, managing director of the
fishing division, Oceana Fishing Group Ltd. 2 March 2000.
5. Kouga Fishing is presently involved in joint venture
arrangements with the following partners:
· Umzamowetu  (3 800 tons of anchovy and 500 tons of
pilchard)  has 18 000 shares in Atlantic Enterprises and
1 000 shares in Bongulethu
· PJO & Partners  (11 tons of South Coast rock lobster) 
is a shareholder in the South Coast rock lobster vessel
Helena Marine
· Pellsrus Historicals  (540 tons of hake trawl quota)  has
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a 35% share in Emile Adrian Vessel Co. (Pty. Ltd) and 
(100 ton hake long-line quota)  a 34% share in Augusta
Vessel Co. (Pty. Ltd.)
· Sikho Nathi  (3 tons abalone)  purchased a factory in
Cape Town for R90 000
· Jeffreys Bay Fish-Mast Fishing  (7 squid permits) has
a 50/50 share with Irvin & Johnson in the vessel
Equinox.
6. Mr Adams is the director of Olympians CC, which is a new
entrant in the Blue Horizon Holdings joint venture
agreement.
7. The acquisition group comprised of Real Africa Investments
Ltd., Brimstone Investment Corporation Ltd., fishermens
associations, pelagic quota holders, local business interests
and individual investors.
8. Realising that the annual dividend was rather meagre, Sea
Harvest offered to buy back employee shares in late 2000,
giving the lucky owners a handsome cash payout. Since
then Sea Harvest has been delisted from the stock
exchange.
9. The fishers were paid R45/kg, as 34 crayfish equals a
kilogram, and had to pay R5 levy for the use of the company
boats. For the last two weeks of the season all 147 permit
holders were paid R192 in the first week and R169 in the
second.
10. Expectations varied wildly, from the 510% of the TACs
suggested by the Access Panel to the 7080% indicated in
the submission from the Food and Allied Workers Union
(Fawu), the most influential union within the fishing
industry. Proposals for a more diversified transformation
schedule never reached the Minister.
11. This is of course often not the case, for example, when
accessibility and gear selectivity severely restrict which
group of users are able to access the stocks. Allocating a
quota to a certain gear group may also have unintended
consequences in terms of by-catch, for example, of species
that are already threatened.
12. A third position, frequently found in the established fishing
industry, is that fish as such is not a resource per se. This
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argument holds that fish is a potential resource which is
turned into an actual resource only through investment in
and the development of catch technology, processing and
marketing. This resource rent, or at least most of it
(deducted from the share due to public management)
therefore belongs to the industry. Without the investment
and the continued commitment of the industry, there is no
resource!
13. Whether this organisational work is to be performed top-
down (by MCM), bottom-up (by the fishers themselves), by
NGOs or all three in combination is an issue of considerable
debate. While ANC has an undisputed record of organising
unions and civics, its ability to organise coastal
communities, especially along the West Coast and South
Coast has been limited, leaving much of the initiative to the
National Party which traditionally relied on the coloured
working class vote.
14. The important distinction is that the political element
should preferably be built into the system, not be used to
pick the lucky winners after the rules have been made. Still,
in all types of ranking systems there are elements of
discretionary judgements, no matter how technical the
criteria.
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